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INTUITIONISM 
Normative intuitionism is the view that there exists an irreducible plurality of basic deontic requirements. Meta-ethical intuitionism is view that the notions “ought,” “right” and their cognates are not analysable in terms of non-normative notions, that the justification of the fundamental requirements of morality is non-inferential, i.e., warranted by appeal to a priori intuition, and that there exist moral truths. These views are often defended as a package. However, it is possible to defend one kind of intuitionism without defending the other. Utilitarians reject normative intuitionism. They are divided over the merits of meta-ethical intuitionism.	The study of the utilitarian engagement with intuitionism assists in understanding the main lines of argument employed by the classical and other utilitarians.  
	One of the earliest intuitionists is Richard Price. In his Review of Principal Questions in Morals (1758), he endorses both normative and meta-ethical intuitionism. He rejects the claim that all “moral good be reduced to one particular species of it” (Price, p.177). He accepts instead a plurality of duties, including duties of respect for God and for those superior to us in station and character, of prudence, of beneficence, of gratitude, of veracity and of justice (pp.178–87). He insists that these duties are not ultimately based on beneficence: our considered view is that we ought to be just, to tell the truth, and to prefer “friends, relations, and benefactors ... to strangers,” even when doing so leads to less good overall (p.170; see also p.176). He does not think that these duties are absolute.  For example, “when the public interest depending is very considerable ... it may set aside every obligation which would otherwise arise from the common rules of justice, from promises, private interest, friendship, gratitude, and all particular attachments and connections.” (pp.181) When we reason morally we have to weigh and balance the various moral considerations that bind us. However, for various reasons, it is difficult to determine what we ought to do, all things considered. Therefore, “it cannot but happen, that we should be frequently in the dark” (p.187).	
	Price argues that our ideas of right, wrong and similar notions are simple ideas, “original and uncompounded perceptions of the mind” (Price, p.135n; also 141). By this he means that these notions are indefinable. His idea is that “Right, fit, ought, should, duty, obligation, convey ... ideas necessarily including one another” (p.162). The source of our knowledge of claims about what it is right or what we ought to do is based on the understanding or intuition (p.142). The most basic moral principles are knowable in this way because they are self-evident, i.e., knowable on the basis of a keen understanding of their content alone. The object of our knowledge is necessary truths, rather like the truths of geometry (pp.157, 187). The moral characteristics that are predicated of actions are “real characters of actions,” which “must immutably and necessarily belong to those actions of which they are truly affirmed” (p.148).
	In An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), Jeremy Bentham takes issue with several aspects of intuitionism. He is most concerned to undermine normative intuitionism. This involves attacking Price’s account of moral knowledge. Bentham claims that the sort of view that Price defends involves subscribing to a principle of sympathy and antipathy: “that principle which approves or disapproves of certain actions, not on account of their tending to augment the happiness, nor yet on account of their tending to diminishing the happiness of the party whose interest is in question, but merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them.” (Bentham, 1996, p.25) This description fits Price’s view because it relies on the understanding to determine the criterion of right and wrong (p.26). The problem with this position is that it makes right and wrong depend on what one’s understanding approves or disapproves. This will not do: “what one expects to find in a principle is something that points out some external consideration, as a means of warranting and guiding the internal sentiments of approbation and disapprobation.” (p.25) What Price’s view lacks is a publicly verifiable standard that one can appeal to in moral reasoning. Utilitarianism provides this by making approval and disapproval dependent entirely on what is most conducive to the greatest sum total of aggregate happiness (pp.11–12). The considerations of relevance to the principle of utility do not depend on anyone’s attitudes or judgements and they are publically and empirically verifiable.
	In reply, Price may concede that the consequences of an action in terms of happiness are empirically verifiable, but argue that the claim that we have reason to accept this as the only criterion to guide our approval and disapproval is not. Bentham might defend this claim by insisting that empirical verification is the only criterion that determines what serves as the standard of approval and disapproval. This is, however, difficult to defend. It relies on a view about what we have reason to believe, which seems, Price might argue, to be backed up by no more than what Bentham approves of, and so seems to fall prey to Bentham’s worry about Price’s position. Even if this worry is put aside, it is not clear that Bentham’s empirical criterion rules out all aspects of Price’s moral view. For example, we can empirically verify that someone has told the truth. This may, then, be something that is relevant to what we ought to do, even on the assumption that moral questions are to be decided on the “track of experiment and observation” (Bentham, 1838–43, vol. 2, p.495). The best that Bentham can do to block this line of reply is to argue that whether a lie has been told is not merely a matter of empirical verification. 
	John Stuart Mill’s main quarrel is with normative intuitionism. Like Bentham, he understands this to be the view that there exists a plurality of basic synthetic a priori moral principles, which are known via intuition (Mill, CW, vol. 10, pp.206–207; see also p.170). He takes the epistemic element of meta-ethical intuitionism to be inextricably connected to normative intuitionism. Mill’s most prominent worry about the latter position is that it is unsystematic. He thinks that to support their claims intuitionists ought to outline a “fundamental principle or law, at the root of all morality, or if there be several, there should be a determinate order of precedence among them; and the one principle, or the rule for deciding between the various principles when they conflict, ought to be self-evident.” (pp.206–207; see also vol. 8, p.951). Mill, with Bentham, takes a dim view of unsystematic moral theories (vol. 10, p.111; Bentham, 1996, p.16). He believes that one of the chief merits of utilitarianism is that it can resolve conflicts between competing considerations (Mill, CW, vol. 10, pp.225–6, 253–5). 
	This is a charge that is hard to make stick against those who do not find system an attractive aim in moral philosophy. Price thinks that the search for “uniformity and simplicity” where it is not clear it can be found is “unreasonable” and has, in natural philosophy, “often led men astray” (Price, p.177). The later intuitionist W.D. Ross suggests that system in ethics is worth little if it comes at the expense of “loyalty” to the moral facts (Ross, p.23). 
	The charge of lacking in system may be turned against Mill. In his well-known attempt to defend hedonism from the charge that is it a “doctrine worthy only of swine” (Mill, CW, vol. 10, p.210), he argues that the value of a unit of pleasure is a function of both its quantity and its quality. Mill maintains that intellectual pleasures are more valuable as a kind than pleasures of mere sensation on the grounds that intellectual pleasures are higher in quality (pp.211, 213). When it comes to the question of how to balance the factors of quality and quantity, Mill says that “the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity… [is] the preference felt by those who, in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison.” (p.214) The balancing of the two dimensions seems not to satisfy the requirements that Mill imposes on those who espouse a plurality of moral requirements. Furthermore, it is not clear why the proponent of normative intuitionism is unable to appeal to a similar mechanism in resolving conflicts between principles. Rather than appeal to the felt preferences of those best furnished with the means of comparison, the normative intuitionist could appeal to the considered moral judgements of the best and the brightest moralists. When they disagree, it could be argued, we should defer to the majority. 
	This is, of course, not the end of Mill’s quest to establish the inferiority of normative intuitionism. His aim in Utilitarianism (1863) is to show that “whatever steadiness or consistency these [mankind’s] moral beliefs have attained, has been mainly due to the tacit influence of a standard not recognised.” (Mill, CW, vol. 10, p.207) It is not possible to evaluate Mill’s claim here. However, it is worth noting that he relies on the following principle to defend utilitarianism: “one person’s happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another’s.” (p.257) The problem with this is that it is not clear how Mill can defend it on the basis of nothing but “observation and experience” (p.206). A proper philosophical defense of this idea seems to require more than appeal to these considerations. This suggests that Mill might himself have to appeal to intuition to defend his view (he does not appear to rule this out (p.230)).
	Mill has serious reservations about such appeals. He claims that views appealing to intuition amount to no more than a “classification and systematizing of the opinions which [one finds] ... prevailing among those who had been educated according to the approved methods of ... [one’s] own country; or, let us rather say, an apparatus for converting those prevailing opinions, on matters of morality, into reasons for themselves.” (Mill, CW, vol. 10, p.169; see also pp.194–5) Mill took the intuitionist’s epistemology to be the handmaiden of conservative views in ethics. So concerned was Mill to undermine this epistemology that in his System of Logic (1843) he tried to show that it failed even in the domains in which it was thought to be most successful, e.g., mathematics. His worry is that “The notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition ... independently of observation and experience, is ... the great intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions. By the aid of this theory, every inveterate belief and every intense feeling ... is enabled to dispense with the obligation of justifying itself by reason, and is erected into its own all-sufficient voucher and justification. There never was such an instrument devised for consecrating all deep seated prejudices.” (CW, vol. 1, p.233) 
	This is not a plausible argument. It does not follow from the fact that a view has been associated with false moral views that it is itself false. It might be that it has been badly or carelessly employed. There is nothing, it seems, making it necessarily the case that epistemic intuitionism leads to conservative opinions. Mill should be especially sympathetic to such an argument, since he himself concedes that the principle of utility was at one time used to support conservative moral opinions (Mill, CW, vol. 10, p.173). This did not stop him from thinking that it could be used to support more progressive moral attitudes instead. Perhaps the best way to protect against the problematic use of intuition is to articulate ways of avoiding error in its usage.
	This is Henry Sidgwick’s view. Sidgwick deviates quite sharply from his utilitarian predecessors in explicitly accepting all of the main features of meta-ethical intuitionism (Sidgwick, pp.vii, 32, 379). In particular, he thinks that an appeal to intuition is essential to the defence of utilitarianism (pp.xviii-xix, 379–89). Sidgwick endorses what he describes as philosophical intuitionism, the view that there exists “one or more principles more absolutely and undeniably true and evident”, i.e., self-evident (p.102; see also p.379). He holds that when we search for such intuitions we find that the most plausible ones support utilitarianism. These include, among others, the claim that “as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally,—so far as it is attainable by my efforts,—not merely at a particular part of it.” (p.382) Sidgwick is aware that intuitions are susceptible to error. He argues that the best route to finding reliable intuitions is to articulate a set of characteristics “by which self-evident truths are distinguished from mere opinions” (p.338). There are four such characteristics: that the proposition in question be clear and precise, that it be ascertained by careful reflection, that it be consistent with other self-evident propositions that one holds, and that disagreement regarding its truth be absent or rationally explained away (pp.338–42).
	Sidgwick is patient and exhaustive in his discussion of normative intuitionism. He rejects it on the grounds that the main moral rules that it lays down do not possess all of the characteristics outlined above (Sidgwick, pp.343–61). He thinks that when the principles are left imprecise and vague they garner agreement, but that when we eliminate the imprecision and vagueness we produce rational disagreement (pp.342–3). Consider the requirement that one ought to keep one’s promises. Sidgwick says that when the requirement is put forward in this form, there is no disagreement regarding its truth. The claim therefore satisfies the last test. However, it does so in part because it is not clear and precise and therefore fails the first test. The principle gives no guidance as to what to do in certain practical situations, especially those where competing moral considerations are present. To make such a principle precise it requires specification and it needs to be related to those principles with which it might conflict. But there is no agreement about how to do this. For example, all agree that we have a duty of beneficence, which means that we ought to contribute to worthy causes. If one has promised all of one’s surplus cash to an undeserving friend, then most think it wrong to beg off on the promise in order to give to a worthy cause. In this sort of case, it seems that a promise can make it wrong to do what it would otherwise be a duty to do in the absence of the promise (p.305). It is, however, less clear as to what to do when you have promised that you’ll give your undeserving friend your surplus cash but then find that you need it to provide your children with a good education. To decide this issue we need to distinguish “between different kinds or degrees of obligatoriness in duties” (p.305). There are reasonable disagreements about how precisely to do this. Therefore, the moment that we try to get clarity and precision we produce rational disagreement. 
	Sidgwick has a problem. It is not clear that his intuitions possess the characteristics that distinguish self-evident truths from mere opinions. He puts forward a number of intuitions that he thinks undergird utilitarianism (Sidgwick, pp.379–82). Perhaps the most important is the one mentioned above. The difficulty is that it is agreed to by many, including some intuitionists, but this is the case, it might be argued, because it is imprecise and vague. We might in particular worry about what is good. Once we give Sidgwick’s answer—pleasure—then agreement disappears (Sidgwick, pp.391-407). Price thinks that there is more than one good. Even if we were to secure agreement on Sidgwick’s answer there is still room for disagreement, since many disagree about the nature of pleasure. Sidgwick himself seems unclear about what it is (pp.93, 94, 127). He therefore seems no better off than his normative intuitionist foes.
	In the twentieth century the most prominent intuitionist is W.D. Ross. Like Price, Ross maintains that the terms “ought,” “right,” and so on, are incapable of definition, that the basic requirements of morality are non-inferentially warranted because self-evident, and that there exist moral truths (Ross, pp.1–15, 29, 29–30, 32). He thinks that there is a plurality of duties, including duties of fidelity to promises, of reparation, of gratitude, of beneficence, and of non-maleficence (pp.26–28). He does not think that these duties are absolute. Rather, there exist prima facie, not absolute duties (pp.19–20). His idea is that each of the duties specifies a factor that counts in favour of or against an act. The fact that an act benefits another being counts in favour of it; the fact that an act harms another being that does not deserve it counts against it. The principles that he thinks are basic are to be weighed and balanced in thinking about what we ought to do. He is certain that we are bound by the duties listed above (p.30). He is not, however, at all certain about what we ought to do, all things considered, in any particular situation. Instead, this is a matter of “probable opinion” only (p.33; see also pp.19, 31). Ross seeks to capture the most important elements of common-sense morality: “the main moral convictions of the plain man seem to me to be, not opinions which it is for philosophy to prove or disprove, but knowledge from the start.” (pp.20–21n). In fact, “the moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics just as sense-perceptions are the data of a nature science” (p.41). On the basis of this, Ross argues that utilitarians cannot make proper sense of the common-sense obligation to keep one’s promises. His view is that promises are not just devices for promoting good states of affairs (p.38). Suppose that you have promised to visit a friend in the hospital. Before leaving you notice that your neighbour needs your help. You have not made a promise to her. You see quite clearly that all things considered, including both immediate and long-term consequences, you’ll produce slightly more surplus good by helping your neighbor than you will by visiting your friend. Utilitarianism seems to oblige you to break your promise. But this is not the verdict of common-sense morality. Hence, utilitarianism cannot make sense of our common-sense attitudes about the moral importance of promise keeping.
	Ross’s argument was attacked in two ways by utilitarians. These attacks were directed to his normative view and to his account of what counts as evidence for it. The first was by those who were friendly to ideal utilitarianism, such as A.C. Ewing (1953; see also Johnson, 1959). Their main tack involved demonstrating that one could make sense of common-sense moral judgements without departing from the utilitarian theory of rightness. The second line of reply, supplied by R.M. Hare (1971), attacked Ross’s claim that the judgements of common-sense morality constitute the data of ethics. 
Ideal utilitarians attempt to capture the verdicts of common-sense morality respecting promise keeping by expanding the inventory of goods that they endorse to include the good of keeping one’s promises (or at least the evil of breaking one’s promises). This allows them to retain the animating idea behind utilitarianism—that it is wrong to do less than the impartial best—while capturing the main elements of common-sense moral thought in the sort of cases that Ross discusses. They can argue on this basis that the reason we ought to keep our promise to visit our friend in the hospital is that promise-breaking is bad. 
This approach makes it more difficult for utilitarians to correct and to revise common-sense moral thinking. This may not be problematic to some. What’s more problematic is that because the two views are close in outcome it is difficult to see what might establish the superiority of one view over the other. Ewing says that he favours the ideal utilitarian view over Ross’s because he has a greater sympathy with the “Greek view of ethics which thinks of the right life as consisting primarily in the pursuit of valuable concrete ends” (Ewing, p.77). But this may be the undoing of the view, since this implies that we ought to break one promise to stop two promises from being broken. This is not clearly the view of the plain man.
	Price and Ross seek to produce a view that justifies the judgments of the plain man. They think this is what in part secures their case against their utilitarian opponents. In reply, some utilitarians have returned to the Benthamite idea of completely rejecting common sense as a reliable basis for ethical theorising. Hare, for example, argues that “common moral opinions have in themselves no probative force whatever in moral philosophy” (Hare, p.122). His idea is that common-sense moral judgements have been wrong in the past, e.g., the plain man once held that mixed bathing is intrinsically wrong (p.118), and therefore we need a mechanism for determining which common-sense judgments to accept and which to reject. This involves moving beyond common-sense morality. 
	Ross has two replies to Hare. There is very little in Ross of the features of common sense that many, including Hare, find objectionable. His view contains, for example, nothing racist, nothing praising the English imperial project and almost nothing on sexual questions. Indeed, Ross is quite open to the idea that many common-sense attitudes could be revised. Many of them “are merely fallible opinions based on an imperfect study of the working for good or evil of certain institutions or types of action.” (Ross, pp.20-21n; see also p.13) This suggests that Ross would be quite friendly to Hare’s claim that there is nothing wrong with mixed bathing since it harms no one (Hare, p.118). The question is whether Hare’s argument undermines the few core principles on which Ross relies. Hare thinks that harms and benefits matter to what we ought to do (p.127). These attitudes form the basis of his objection to certain common-sense attitudes. It would be hard to deny that harms and benefits matter. Ross can insist that his view about promise keeping is more like Hare’s opinion on harm and benefit than it is like the common-man’s opinion on the morality of mixed bathing or slavery.  It is hard to see how the kinds of factors that impugn conservative sexual and other attitudes (e.g., that they are the outcome of outmoded religious views) could be used to undermine the claim that it is right to keep one’s promises or that one ought to express gratitude. Hare does suggest that you can provide a utilitarian explication of these views, but these are easier for intuitionists to resist. 
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